Abstract-The network congestion is caused by the rapidly growing data traffic and the limited wireless radio resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the network traffic is expected to rise 1000 times in ten year [1] , traffic congestion management has been a challenging issue for service providers (SPs) under the constraint of scarce wireless resources. Traditionally, network pricing has been a good approach to manage the traffic congestion. For example, SPs charge end users (EUs) for the broadband access to the network so as to alleviate the congestion level. Recently, peering agreements among content providers (CPs) and SPs have become popular with the purpose of granting higher speed resources for CPs with enormous traffic requirement. Thus, the two-sided market forms, where EUs and CPs are the two sides of SPs. In addition to the licensed spectrum, unlicensed spectrum access technology is considered by SPs as a solution to accommodate more users. In this paper, considering the scenario where one SP adopts both licensed and unlicensed wireless broadband access technologies (e.g., LTE and LAA), we propose the network pricing models with premium peering among CPs and the Sp.
The 3rd Partnership Project (3GPP) has kicked off a study item on a single global framework for licensed-assisted access (LAA) to unlicensed spectrum [2] , also called LTE-U. LAA not only leverages SPs' existing investment on LTE equip ments, but also caters the significantly increasing demand for wireless broadband data. Inter-technology coexistence mech anisms, e.g., reusing the blank subframe approach and the 346 uplink power control management proposed in [3] , are required to improve the fairness, interference and performance of both LAA and existing unlicensed radio access technology such as IEEE 802.11. The concept of ISM-Advanced in [4] considers to incorporate cognitive radio capabilities into the rule for unlicensed spectrum access in ISM bands (Industrial Scientific Medical Band) so as to improve the spectrum efficiency and QoS (Quality of Service). Through spectrum sensing, a cognitive mobile virtual network operator (C-MVNO) can improve its expected profit and users' payoff by considering the cost and uncertainty of the spectrum [5] . From a service provider's perspective, the pricing model can turn over a new leaf in the co-existence of existing wireless broadband network with leased bandwidth (e.g. LTE) and promising radio access technology with unlicensed bandwidth (e.g. LAA).
Premium peering agreement appears in the network market among CPs and the SP, where CPs with higher traffic require ments pay more so that it can gain extra resource access and be guaranteed with higher QoS to satisfy their subscribers. For example, Netflix signed a deal with AT&T in July 2014 to deliver its streaming content via wireless broadband network with higher capacity. The design of AT&T sponsored data program in [6] is developed via a Stackelberg game between an SP leader and a CP follower. A utility maximization based rate allocation model with pricing CPs in [7] indicates that the CPs can gain net surplus in the monopolistic and competitive market. An analysis for premium peering using real world data is carried out in [8] , but the proposed Nash bargaining pricing scheme can be infeasible because the SP grants the premium access for free. This work contributes a premium peering pncmg model considering the SP provides both LTE and LAA wireless broadband access technologies. The SP, as a Stackelberg leader, decides the amount of licensed and unlicensed band width. Through job market signaling game and second price auction, the premium access price is determined among the bids offered by several CPs. Those CPs, as the Stackelberg followers, thereby determine their bandwidth demand. This research brings insights on the benefit of premium peering deal and LAA to confront the soaring traffic requirement. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model with one SP and several CPs. The demand and supply for the bandwidth, the premium access price and the basic access fee are derived via backward induction in Section III. Numerical results are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes this work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider one SP, which operates a wireless broadband Internet network and M CPs participate to deliver their con tent, as illustrated in After obtaining spectrum for LTE and LAA, the SP an nounces the power allocation factor A and negotiates the issues of premium peering with CPs. The choice of A is made by the SP beforehand and detailed in stage III. As equipment constraints are common for SPs, we assume that the SP executes power allocation for one specific CP, called CPH, to allow its premium access by delivering its content with higher data rate. For each CP i, the aggregate content delivery rate (in nats) is
where Wi is the allocated bandwidth, pmax is the SP's maximum transmission power, no is the noise spectral density, hi is the channel gain among the SP and CP i's subscribers. A is power allocation factor for CP i, which improves CP i's SNR. We assume that only the CPH is provided with the power allocation for SNR improvement. Therefore, 0i = 1 when CP i is the CPH. Otherwise, Oi = 0 without premium access. In addition to the identical price bo per unit bandwidth charged to all the CPs, CPH pays extra fee bA for its premium access service. That is, the total price charged to the CPH includes the basic service bOWi and premium access bA.
In a paid peering deal, power allocation technique is a critical element for it distinguishes the CPH from the rest of the CPs. As literature suggests, operating ability generates profits through utilizing resources efficiently. High-ability SPs often receive loans with favorable terms [9] , and capable to upgrade equipments to improve the CPH's SNR. Operating ability cannot be directly observed by CPs, but CPs can assess the true operating ability through observable information, e.g., level of certification, financial records, news reports, etc. Despite the fact that some observable information is not at the discretion of the SP, the level of certification is what can be invested with time and money [10] . Thus, we refer to the level of certification as a signal emitted by the SP to determine the paid peering deal. After the SP announces the basic price bo and premium access price b, each CP ask the SP for its required bandwidth to maximize its payoff.
which is the difference between the aggregate data rate and total payment for service.
The system is modelled as a four-stage Stackelberg game as shown in Fig. 2 , where the SP is the leader and CPs are the followers. First, the SP decides the amount of unlicensed bandwidth B u for LAA. Then, it determines the amount of licensed bandwidth based on the realized effective unlicensed spectrum. In stage 3, the SP grants premium access through job market signaling game and second price auction, and announces the CPH and prices, bo and b, based on the total effective spectrum supply o:B u + B l . 
III. BACKWARD INDUCTION: JOB MARKET SIGNALING GAME ApPROACH
Stackelberg game falls in the category of the dynamic game, whose solution concept is the Subgame perfect equilib rium (SPE). The SPE is often determined through backward induction by examining that each subgame reaches the Nash equilibrium. Hence, the four-stage Stackelberg game can be solved sequentially via backward induction to achieve the SPE.
A. Stage 4 : CPs' Bandwidth Demand
After acquiring the knowledge of the premium access price b and the basic price bo from the SP, CP i determines its bandwidth requirement Wi to deliver its content. From CP i's point of view, it can not distinguish whether its content is delivered via LTE or LAA. We assume CP i knows the SP's maximum transmission power pm ax and the channel gain between SP to its subscribers hi. hi and Wi are private information to CP i itself.
To simplify the notations, let gi = pm ax hdno. The SNR of CP i's aggregate delivery can be written as gi(l + OiA)/Wi.
To obtain closed-form solutions, we focus on the high SNR regime where SNR » 1 with good signal quality to deliver the content. Thus, CP i's aggregate content delivery rate in Eq.
(1) can be approximated as Ti(Wi) = Wi1n(9; ( 1:t;.\ ) ), and its payoff is
Here we implicitly assume that content delivery rate can be transformed to some forms of monetary benefits, a common assumption in game theory literature. Because ui(bo, b, Wi) is concave in Wi, the unique bandwidth demand Wi can be obtained in Eq. (2) via differential operation to maximizes CP i's payoff.
Eq. (2) is always positive, linear in gi, and decreasing in price boo Since gi is linear in channel gain hi and transmission power pm ax , a better channel condition or a larger transmission power will increase CP i's demand. It is clear that w/ (bo, b) is upper bounded by gi(l + OiA) e-1 for any choice of price bo ;::: O. In other words, even if the SP announces a zero price bo = 0, CP i will not purchase infinite amount of radio resources. The reason is that infinite bandwidth demand leads to the reduced received SNR, and the subscribers cannot detect the signal carrying the delivered content when the received SNR is below a threshold.
We also consider the situation that premium peering is forbidden (i.e., b = 0 and A = O\fi). Derive from Eq. 
i EM where G = Li EM gi(l + OiA). The demand D is the same as the total bandwidth supply by setting bo equal to the market clearing price. Usually, the licensed and unlicensed bandwidth is scarce in nature. Thus, the demand which is served by the SP is referred to as the realized demand Q, which is the total effective bandwidth supply in Eq. (6). are summarized by Ta ble II. The derivation of Ta ble II was basically mentioned in [5] , but here we also take into account the profit which arises from premium peering.
Eq. (7) indicates that the total supply of spectrum exceeds
Ge-2 happens when spectrum reserve is much greater than spectrum demanded, and contradicts the fact that spectrum scarcity is a prevalent problem today. In addition, if the acquired bandwidth is too large, selling all the bandwidth will lead to a very low price that decreases the revenue. The profit can be apparently improved if the SP acquires less bandwidth in stages 1 and 2. Therefore, we will focus on the case where the total supply does not exceed Ge-2 in the rest of this paper.
Another issue is to determine the CPH and the additional fee bA it contributes. Each CP offers its bid for the expected premium access based on the signal sent by the SP. We then combine job market signaling game with second price auction. A second price auction is a type of sealed-bid auction in which the highest bid wins but the paid price is the second-highest bid; studies show that it insures the property of truth-telling [11] . The mechanism is presented as follows:
1) Nature determines the SP's operating ability, T), which can be either high (h) or low (l) . The probability of which T) = h is q.
2)
The SP learns its ability and then chooses a level of certification related to maintaining high speed, s ;::: O.
(e.g., Internet speed survey, ISO/IEC 27001, etc.) 3)
M CPs observe the SP's certification and then simul taneously make price offers to the SP.
4)
The SP accepts the highest bid among the M price offers (i.e., bi, i = 1,2,3, ... , M), flipping a coin in case of a tie. Let b* denotes the second highest price the SP receives.
Regarding the price of the additional access fee bi, Propo sition 1 presents its feasible range. However, the SP may not maintain the power allocation system with prudence after signing the peering deal. To avoid such principal-agent problem [12] , an incentive in the contract to the SP should consider b* A -fJ * A > 0, which implies Eq. (11). (11) where fJ * is the optimal lower bound derived from optimal auction theory [13] . Since any CP k could be the CPH, by combining Eqs. (10) and (11) • If maXk#i bkA < Vi, then the bidder would win the bid with a truthful bid as well as an overbid. The bid price does not change the utility so the two strategies have equal utilities in this case.
• If maXk#i bkA > biA, then the bidder would lose the bid either way so both strategies have equal utilities.
• If Vi < maxk#i bkA < biA, then only the strategy of overbidding would win the auction. The utility would be negative for the strategy of overbidding because it paid more than its value of the bid, while the utility for a truthful bid would be zero.
Thus the strategy of bidding higher than one's true valuation is dominated by the strategy of truthfully bidding.
The strategy of underbidding is dominated by bidding truthfully. Assume that fJA < biA < Vi.
• If maxk#i bkA > Vi, then the bidder would lose the bid with a truthful bid as well as an underbid, so the strategies have equal utilities for this case.
• If maxk#i bkA < biA, then the bidder would win the bid either way so both strategies have equal utilities.
• If biA < maxk#i bkA < Vi, then only the strategy of truthfully bidding would win the auction. The utility for the truthful strategy would be positive as it paid less than its value of the bid, while the utility for an underbid bid is strictly inferior to the former.
Thus the strategy of underbidding is dominated by the strategy of truthfully bidding. Truthful bidding dominates the other possible strategies (underbidding and overbidding) so it is an optimal strategy. The SP decides the optimal licensed amount B l in LTE given the unlicensed amount B u , Brax = Ge -2 -B u a.
JrfP(a, B u ) = max JrrP(a, B u ,B l )
O::;B, ::;Ge-2 -Bu.a
To solve Eq. (12), we need to consider the bandwidth obtained from unlicensed spectrum. By taking the partial derivatives of JrfP(a, B u ) with respect to B l , we obtain the optimal licensed amount and the optimal profit, summarized in Ta ble III.
From Ta ble III, it is clear that we have an optimal threshold policy here: the SP would like to achieve a total bandwidth equal to Ge -( 2 +ctl whenever possible. When the bandwidth obtained from unlicensed spectrum is not enough, the SP obtains additional bandwidth from licensed spectrum to reach the threshold, or the SP does not acquire licensed bandwidth. The SP decides the optimal unlicensed amount to maximize its expected profit by considering the uncertainty of the access reliability factor 0: in LAA. The SP needs to solve the following problem: 7rc p = O�B �t�;;,ax E ( 7rfP(o:, B u ) ) , (13) by taking the expectation of 0: over the profit functions in stage 2 (i.e., the optimal profit functions in Ta ble III). We assume that the access reliability factor 0: follows a uniform distribu tion in [ 0, 1] . To avoid the case where unlimited unlicensed bandwidth is optimal, we refer to [5] and further assume that the cost of unlicensed bandwidth lies in [(1 -e -2q) /4, c z /2].
7rfP (B u ) is a strictly concave function of B u since its second-order derivative
Ta ble V describes briefly the unlicensed amount obtained by the SP. The optimal unlicensed amount B u * is the unique solution to the following equation:
The uniqueness of the solution is due to the strict concavity of 7rfP (B u ) over B u . B u * lies in [ Ge -( 2 +ctl , Ge -2] and is linear in G. Finally, the SP 's optimal expected profit is
The optimal unlicensed amount is sUlmned up in Ta ble IV. Ta ble V sUlmnarizes the SP's equilibrium spectrum amount, pricing decisions and resource allocation to the CPH.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
Considering the access reliability factor of LAA spectrum, we begin with the comparison between the impact of premium peering (PP) and network neutrality (NN) on the profit of the SP and CPs. When NN rules, the SP is not allowed to charge any payment from CPs and does not provide the opportunity for premium peering, i.e., bo=O, b=O and A=O for all CPs. 
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In Fig. 3 , we observe that under NN the average payoff of CPs is lower than that when premium peering exists. We also calculate the coefficient of variance (CV) of resource per CP: the CV for PP is 1.0585 and that for NN is 2.9464. Under NN, though CPs use the radio resources for free, a lack of price signals results in excess demand for bandwidth: all CPs request a large amount of bandwidth, but some of them attain it and others receive none. Conversely, when PP exists, the supply and demand are aligned and the payoff of CPs on average is always positive. In Fig. 4 , PP incurs a loss when access reliability factor 0: is low in LAA, but when 0: is greater than a threshold, the SP's profit is always positive. On the contrary, when NN rules, the SP suffers from great losses. The simulation result is very close to that of the numerical simulation. Studies pointed out that SPs shift part of the spectrum cost to EUs, which avoid them from incurring losses [14] . We leave the question open for future research. When C u is 0.5, it brings in greater losses for the SP. The decision for bandwidth is mainly based on costs; thus, lower costs will induce the SP to fetch more bandwidth, further devastating its profit. When PP exists, the CPH is granted premium access and contributes b)" to the SP. In Fig. 5 , given the same original received SNR g i (e.g" 4 x 10 6 ), when ).. = 0.3, the b)" the CPH is willing to pay is around 9 x 10 4 ; when).. increases to 0.7, it pays a higher additional fee close to 1.2 x 10 5 , reflecting a higher valuation towards greater improvement on SNR. In Fig. 6 , if the access reliability 0: in LAA is above a threshold, adopting LAA can bring extra normalized realized profit for the SP. The crossing feature of the two increasing curves is because the optimal unlicensed amount B � is larger under a lower cost of unlicensed bandwidth (c u = 0.5), which leads to greater realized profit loss when 0: is close to zero. This shows the tradeoff between improvement on the expected profit and the large variability of the realized profit.
Proposition 3. CPs always benefit from the availability of unlicensed spectrum, Proof 3. In the baseline approach without unlicensed band width, the SP always charges the price 1 + Cl. As shown in Ta ble Y, the equilibrium price b'O with unlicensed bandwidth is always no larger than 1 + Cl for any value of 0:. Since CP i's payoff is strictly decreasing in price, CPs always benefit from the availability of unlicensed spectrum. We cope with a premium peering pricing model for content delivery in the co-existence of LTE and LAA wireless network. The pricing problem is solved with a four-stage Stackelberg game coupling with job market signaling game and second price auction. The result shows that the optimal amount of spectrum introduced by the SP is closely related to the access reliability factor in LAA. Moreover, the framework points out that on average CPs still benefit from premium peering access because of the increase in bandwidth and alleviation of excess demand. By properly subsidizing the SP, premium peering can generate appropriate revenues to both the SP and CPs. 
